Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies...

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Torben Iversen (Harvard University, Massachusetts) Peter Lange

Contested Economic Institutions

The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies

Torben Iversen (Harvard University, Massachusetts), Peter Lange, Robert H. Bates (Harvard University) , Ellen Comisso

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English

Cambridge University Press
20 December 1999

Employment & unemployment; Political economy

Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.

By: Torben Iversen (Harvard University Massachusetts)
Series edited by: Peter Lange, Robert H. Bates (Harvard University), Ellen Comisso, Peter Hall
Imprint: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions: Height: 236mm, Width: 159mm, Spine: 21mm
Weight: 450g
ISBN: 9780521642262
ISBN 10: 0521642264
Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Pages: 238
Publication Date: 20 December 1999
Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Primary , Undergraduate
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active

1. Introduction; Part I. The Real Effects of Monetary Policies: 2. An institutional model of economic performance; 3. Economic institutions and performance: quantitative evidence; Part II. The Politics of Institutional Design: 4. A theory of contested institutions; 5. From Keynesian centralization to Monetarist decentralization: five Northern European experiences; 6. Conclusion: the fork in the road for social democracy.

Reviews for Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies

""...provocative, interesting, and well written."" Review of Radical Political Economics ""Explores how macroecenomic policies and economic institutions jointly determine economic performance and distribution."" Journal of Economic Literature