Gillian K, Russell is Professor in philosophy at Australian National University in Canberra. Her PhD is from Princeton University (2004) and in the interim she has been a postdoc at the University of Alberta, Assistant and Associate Professor at Washington University in St Louis, Professor and Alumni Distinguished Professor at UNC Chapel Hill, Professor at the Dianoia Research Institute at ACU Melbourne, and a Professorial Fellow at the Arché Research Center at the University of St Andrews. She mostly works in the philosophy of language and logic, and her previous books include Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.
Each of these various barrier issues has had its own distinctive flavour, and its own associations and repercussions in the history of philosophy. This makes Barriers, quite aside from its intrinsic interest and its many expository virtues, the perfect way of illustrating to a student whose penchant may be - not just for ethics, as in the Is/Ought case - but equally for metaphysics, epistemology or the philosophy of mind, how useful a formal approach to the conceptual fundamentals of the favoured territory can be. This makes it much more valuable, motivationally, than any dry, purely technical introduction to contemporary logical work could ever be. But students aside, any reader with logical interests will find Barriers to be bristling with imaginative curiosity, resourcefully pursued. * Lloyd Humberstone, Australasian Journal of Logic * This book's proof of the Strong General Barrier Theorem is a landmark achievement in twenty-first century philosophy. Not since Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1921) has such an important contribution been made to philosophical logic. Russell has shown the limits of deductive inference, which means, the limits to the very expression of thought. The proof she presents is integral to understanding how and why logical inferences can or cannot be legitimately made based on the properties of the premises involved. If ever there was a litmus test for philosophers to gauge the validity of their arguments, this ought to be it. My only hope is that this work does not go unnoticed. * Christopher John Searle, Philosophy Now * Her proposed account has evolved over the years. This book is the culmination. It achieves a notable degree of success. Even those who quarrel with aspects of her approach will findformal foundations to build on, and an extensive database of formal and informal examples. The book is as reader friendly as it reasonably could be, given the trickiness of the relevant issues. Russell explains the technicalities accessibly, taking very little for granted. Anyone who wants to get up to speed on these problems could not do better than read it. She [Russell] has made an impressive contribution to our understanding of this tricky area. * Timothy Williamson, Journal of Philosophy *