The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
By:
Herman Cappelen (University of St Andrews)
Imprint: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions:
Height: 222mm,
Width: 146mm,
Spine: 20mm
Weight: 438g
ISBN: 9780199644865
ISBN 10: 0199644861
Pages: 256
Publication Date: 01 March 2012
Audience:
College/higher education
,
Professional and scholarly
,
Professional & Vocational
,
A / AS level
,
Further / Higher Education
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
Preface and Acknowledgements 1: Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy Part I: The Argument from 'Intuition'-Talk Introduction to Part I 2: 'Intuitive', 'Intuitively', 'Intuition', and 'Seem' in English 3: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (I): A Defective Practice and the Verbal Virus Theory 4: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (II): Some Strategies for Charitable Interpretation Appendix to Chapter 4: Williamson on Intuition as Belief and Inclination to Believe 5: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (III): Against the Explaining Away of Intuitions Part II: The Argument from Philosophical Practice Introduction to Part II 6: Centrality and Philosophical Practice 7: Diagnostics for Intuitiveness 8: Case Studies 9: Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson 10: Conceptual Analysis and Intuitions 11: A Big Mistake: Experimental Philosophy Bibliography Index
Reviews for Philosophy without Intuitions
Cappelen's book is a wonderfully clear, largely well-argued case against a central assumption of many contemporary metaphilosophers ... it makes the prospect of a general metaphilosophy look very dim ... this is a well-argued, interesting book, challenging contemporary metaphilosophy fundamentally; I highly recommend it. Daniel Cohnitz, Disputatio This is an engaging and exciting book. .. Whether one is convinced by its conclusion or not, Philosophy Without Intutions represents a clear jolt to contemporary metaphilosophical orthodoxy. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy. Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it. Jonathan Ichikawa, International Journal for Philosophical Studies If you're interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy, you need to read this book. Even if you're not particularl concerned by this metaphilosophical issue youwould probably still benefit from reading this book, for it may well convince you to change theway in which you articulate your arguments and interpret other authors. Cappelen has made anexcellent contribution to the ongoing debate over the importance of intuitions in philosophy. Stephen Ingram, Metaphilosophy Experimental results on the variability and intra-personal instability of philosophical intuitions have recently sparked a lively methodological debate about the reliability of the philosophical method. In his new book, Herman Cappelen argues that this entire debate is misguided. The reason is simple: philosophers dont rely on intuitions, so there is no reason for philosophers to worry about their reliability. Cappelens case for this claim amounts to one of the most original and well-argued contributions to recent discussions about philosophical methodology. His book should be essential reading for anyone interested in the debate. Kristoffer AHlstrom-Vij, Philosophical Quarterly I'm glad that Cappelen wrote this book ... It's important because it (indirectly but effectively) draws attention to some challenging questions that it would be very good for meta-philosophy to get clearer on ... it's a refreshing and provocative leftfield attack - one that we probably deserve. Anna-Sara Malmgren, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
