Philosophy without Intuitions

Herman Cappelen (University of St Andrews)

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English

Oxford University Press
31 October 2013

Research methods: general; Analytical philosophy & Logical Positivism; Philosophy of mind

The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.

By: Herman Cappelen (University of St Andrews)
Imprint: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions: Height: 216mm, Width: 142mm, Spine: 14mm
Weight: 308g
ISBN: 9780198703020
ISBN 10: 0198703023
Pages: 256
Publication Date: 31 October 2013
Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , A / AS level , Further / Higher Education
Format: Paperback
Publisher's Status: Active

Preface and Acknowledgements 1: Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy Part I: The Argument from 'Intuition'-Talk Introduction to Part I 2: 'Intuitive', 'Intuitively', 'Intuition', and 'Seem' in English 3: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (I): A Defective Practice and the Verbal Virus Theory 4: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (II): Some Strategies for Charitable Interpretation Appendix to Chapter 4: Williamson on Intuition as Belief and Inclination to Believe 5: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (III): Against the Explaining Away of Intuitions Part II: The Argument from Philosophical Practice Introduction to Part II 6: Centrality and Philosophical Practice 7: Diagnostics for Intuitiveness 8: Case Studies 9: Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson 10: Conceptual Analysis and Intuitions 11: A Big Mistake: Experimental Philosophy Bibliography Index

Herman Cappelen is a professor of philosophy at the University of St Andrews, where he works at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre. He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is the author of many papers and three books: Insensitive Semantics (with Ernest Lepore), Language Turned on Itself (with Ernest Lepore), and Relativism and Monadic Truth (with John Hawthorne).

Reviews for Philosophy without Intuitions

a wonderfully clear, largely well-argued case against a central assumption of many contemporary metaphilosophers ... I highly recommend it. Daniel Cohnitz, Disputatio engaging and exciting ... Philosophy Without Intutions represents a clear jolt to contemporary metaphilosophical orthodoxy. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy. Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it. Jonathan Ichikawa, International Journal for Philosophical Studies an excellent contribution to the ongoing debate Stephen Ingram, Metaphilosophy