Why are some subnational governments more likely to lobby the national government than others? Extant research in social sciences has widely discussed lobbying dynamics in the private sector. However, governments lobby governments, too. In the United States, lobbying is a popular strategy for state and local governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government. Nevertheless, extant research offers limited theoretical analysis or empirical evidence on this phenomenon. This Element provides a comprehensive study of intergovernmental lobbying activities in the United States and, in particular, an institutional analysis of the lobbying decisions of state and local governments. The study findings contribute to public administration, public policy, and political science literature by offering theoretical and empirical insights into the institutional factors that might influence subnational policymaking, fiscal resource management, intergovernmental relations, and democratic representation.
By:
Youlang Zhang (Renmin University of China Beijing) Imprint: Cambridge University Press Country of Publication: United Kingdom Dimensions:
Height: 228mm,
Width: 152mm,
Spine: 5mm
Weight: 150g ISBN:9781009108386 ISBN 10: 1009108387 Series:Elements in Public and Nonprofit Administration Pages: 75 Publication Date:15 December 2022 Audience:
General/trade
,
ELT Advanced
Format:Paperback Publisher's Status: Active
1. Introduction; 2. Executive institutions and lobbying activities of city governments; 3. Legislative professionalism and state lobbying activities; 4. Bottom-up federalism of lobbying investment; 5. Conclusion; References.