This anthology establishes the existence of a distinct and important post-Investigations Wittgenstein, uncovering the overlooked treasures of the final corpus and crystallising key perceptions of what his last thought was achieving. Speaking of a 'third Wittgenstein', this book seeks to correct the traditional bipartite conception of Wittgenstein's thought into his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations by focusing on his neglected last masterpiece, On Certainty, and works contemporaneous with it: Remarks on Colour, Last Writings in the Philosophy of Psychology, and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Â Leading international Wittgenstein scholars reveal why On Certainty should be recognised as one of Wittgenstein's three great works.
This sustained examination shows that the third Wittgenstein breaks new ground with insights unprecedented in both his own work and philosophy more broadly, giving us keys to the solution and dissolution of problems that have plagued philosophy since Descartes, such as philosophical scepticism and the mind-body problem. Wittgenstein's ultimate and revised positions with regard to epistemology, foundationalism, 'grammar', naturalism, the psychology of language, and psychological indeterminacy are clearly delineated. This book also provides new and illuminating accounts of difficult concepts, such as patterns of life, experiencing meaning, meaning blindness, lying and pretence.
Edited by:
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
Imprint: Routledge
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions:
Height: 234mm,
Width: 156mm,
Weight: 453g
ISBN: 9781138257412
ISBN 10: 1138257419
Series: Ashgate Wittgensteinian Studies
Pages: 248
Publication Date: 11 November 2016
Audience:
College/higher education
,
General/trade
,
Primary
,
ELT Advanced
Format: Paperback
Publisher's Status: Active
Contents: Introduction: the idea of a third Wittgenstein, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock; Wittgenstein's foundational metaphors, Avrum Stroll; Two Wittgensteins too many: Wittgenstein's foundationalism, Dan Hutto; On Certainty and the grammaticalization of experience, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock; Knowledge, certainty and scepticism: in Moore's defence, Hans-Johann Glock; Wittgenstein's social naturalism: the idea of 'second nature' after the Philosophical Investigations, José Medina; Wittgenstein and epistemology, John Koethe; What does 'experiencing meaning' mean?, Laurence Goldstein; 'Patterns of life': a third Wittgenstein concept, Michel ter Hark; Pretence and the inner, John V. Canfield; Wittgenstein on lying as a language game, Dale Jacquette; Wittgenstein's answer to 'what is colour?', Jacques Bouveresse; Wittgenstein and the riddle of life, Frank Cioffi; Bibliography; Index.
