The Political Economy of Redistribution in Indonesia: Political Patronage and Favoritism in Intergovernmental...

— —

Gerrit J. Gonschorek (The World Bank, Governance Global Practice, Jakarta, Indonesia, University of Freiburg, Germany)

The Political Economy of Redistribution in Indonesia

Political Patronage and Favoritism in Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Allocations

Gerrit J. Gonschorek (The World Bank, Governance Global Practice, Jakarta, Indonesia, University of Freiburg, Germany)

$90.99

Paperback

Not in-store but you can order this
How long will it take?

Availability Information

We source books from suppliers in Australia and overseas. For books we don't currently have in stock, the time it takes to get them from our suppliers can vary widely - from a few days to a few months - so we check each book with each supplier to determine the expected time it will take to be supplied to us.

We then advise you accordingly. If the time taken to get any book is too long for you, you can let us know and we will cancel or adjust your order, and refund as required.

To find out the anticipated arrival time for specific items prior to ordering, please contact us by phone or email:

Phone +61 2 9264 3111, or 1800 4 BOOKS (1800 4 26657) if outside Sydney:
option 1 Abbey's Bookshop (Crime, History, Science, Kids & more) • info@abbeys.com.au
option 2 Language Book Centre (ESL & Foreign Languages) • language@abbeys.com.au
option 3 Galaxy Bookshop (Sci-fi, Fantasy, Romance, Graphic Novels) • sf@galaxybooks.com.au

QTY:

English

Routledge
06 May 2025

Regional studies; Politics & government; International economics; Development economics; Political economy

Series: Routledge Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia

This book analyses how different institutional intergovernmental transfer designs influence patronage and favoritism in public fund allocations in Indonesia.

Presenting original research and investigating existing theories on the determinants of public fund allocations, the book uses Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia, often claimed to be characterized by money politics, provides an ideal setting for this analysis. The countries' decentralized fiscal system consists of various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs allocating public funds to a large variety of districts to finance public service provision. The author exploits those distinctive differences between various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs and investigates their influence on the prevalence of favoritism and patronage in public funds allocations while holding the political system, the observation period, and the government officials involved constant.

A valuable contribution to the literature on the political economy of redistribution, this book will be of interest to academics working on economics and political science, particularly in public finance and development economics, but also in development studies or Southeast Asian studies.

By: Gerrit J. Gonschorek (The World Bank Governance Global Practice Jakarta Indonesia University of Freiburg Germany)
Imprint: Routledge
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions: Height: 234mm, Width: 156mm,
Weight: 370g
ISBN: 9781032299464
ISBN 10: 1032299460
Series: Routledge Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia
Pages: 184
Publication Date: 06 May 2025
Audience: College/higher education , Primary
Format: Paperback
Publisher's Status: Active

Gerrit J. Gonschorek is a Consultant at The World Bank, Governance Global Practice (GGP), Jakarta, Indonesia. He received his PhD from the Institute of Economics, Department of International Economic Policy, Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg, Germany.

Reviews for The Political Economy of Redistribution in Indonesia: Political Patronage and Favoritism in Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Allocations

“Using Indonesia as a case study, this book examines how different institutional intergovernmental transfer designs influence patronage and favoritism in public funding allocations. Located at the intersection of Economics and Political Science, the author thoughtfully employs existing analytical frameworks and modifies them to the circumstances of a young and evolving democracy characterized by highly personalistic politics and a weak party system. It is a very fine piece of research.” – Hal Hill, Australian National University