PERHAPS A GIFT VOUCHER FOR MUM?: MOTHER'S DAY

Close Notification

Your cart does not contain any items

$132.95

Hardback

Not in-store but you can order this
How long will it take?

QTY:

English
Cambridge University Press
06 December 2018
At the turn of the twentieth century, G. E. Moore contemptuously dismissed most previous 'ethical systems' for committing the 'Naturalistic Fallacy'. This fallacy - which has been variously understood, but has almost always been seen as something to avoid - was perhaps the greatest structuring force on subsequent ethical theorising. To a large extent, to understand the Fallacy is to understand contemporary ethics. This volume aims to provide that understanding. Its thematic chapters - written by a range of distinguished contributors - introduce the history, text and philosophy behind Moore's charge of fallacy and its supporting 'open question' argument. They detail how the fallacy influenced multiple traditions in ethics (including evolutionary, religious and naturalistic approaches), its connections to supposed dichotomies between 'is'/'ought' and facts/values, and its continuing relevance to our understanding of normativity. Together, the chapters provide a historical and opinionated introduction to contemporary ethics that will be essential for students, teachers and researchers.

Edited by:  
Imprint:   Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication:   United Kingdom
Dimensions:   Height: 253mm,  Width: 177mm,  Spine: 20mm
Weight:   670g
ISBN:   9781107168794
ISBN 10:   1107168791
Series:   Classic Philosophical Arguments
Pages:   294
Publication Date:  
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Undergraduate
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active

Neil Sinclair is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. He has written for a number of journals such as Analysis, The Philosophical Quarterly, Biology and Philosophy and The European Journal of Philosophy, and was co-editor with Uri D. Leibowitz of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability (2016).

See Also