The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism: Neuroethics and Seeming States

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Hossein Dabbagh (New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK and the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK)

The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism

Neuroethics and Seeming States

Hossein Dabbagh (New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK and the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK)

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English

Bloomsbury Academic
29 December 2022

Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge; Ethics & moral philosophy

Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral

emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the

epistemology of moral intuitionism.

His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from

empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based

account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The

Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological

intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of

the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment.

The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of

understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming

and perceptual experience.

By: Hossein Dabbagh (New College of the Humanities Northeastern University London UK and the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education UK)
Imprint: Bloomsbury Academic
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions: Height: 234mm, Width: 156mm, Spine: 25mm
Weight: 454g
ISBN: 9781350297579
ISBN 10: 1350297577
Pages: 264
Publication Date: 29 December 2022
Audience: Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active

Acknowledgements Introduction Part I: Mind 1. Philosophical Intuition’s Mental Ontology 2. Moral Intuition’s Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition 3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence Part II: Epistemology 4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard’s and W. D. Ross’s Ideas 5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism Part III: Neuroethics 6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists’ Position 7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong’s Position Afterword Notes Bibliography Index

Hossein Dabbagh is Assistant Professor in Applied Ethics at New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK, and Philosophy Tutor at the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK.

Reviews for The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism: Neuroethics and Seeming States

How does moral cognition work? And do our moral judgments ever amount to genuine knowledge? In this outstanding book, Hossein Dabbagh answers both questions: along the way, the intuitionist moral epistemology he develops shows how to resist empirically motivated moral skepticism and to vindicate intuitions as the foundation of moral knowledge. * Hanno Sauer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Utrecht University, The Netherlands *