The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community’s (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences.
In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran’s civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates.
One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.
Preface Introduction: How could getting it right go so wrong? The 2007 Iran NIE revisited PART I 1. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities – Key judgments 2. CIA support to policymakers: the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities 3. Reevaluating the ‘externals’ and ‘internals’ of the 2007 Iran nuclear NIE PART II 4. Reflections on the 2007 Iran NIE controversy 5. 2007 Iran nuclear NIE: more of the story 6. Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 7. The November 2007 Iran nuclear NIE: immediate aftermath PART III 8. Reflections on conveying uncertainty 9. The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications PART IV 10. Shifting currents: changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the Iran nuclear threat 11. U.S.–Iran confrontation in the post-NIE world: an analysis of alternative policy options 12. Weapons of mass destruction: the issue of ‘actionable’ intelligence Epilogue: The rise of counter-proliferation intelligence
Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, USA. He is the author of many books, including Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (2010). He received his Ph.D. from University of California, Berkeley, USA. James J. Wirtz is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA. He recently completed co-editing the 7th edition of Strategy in the Contemporary World (2022). He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, USA.
