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English
Oxford University Press
15 February 2009
This book describes the theory structure underlying contests, in which players expend effort and/or spend money in trying to get ahead of one another. Uniquely, this effort is sunk and cannot be recovered, regardless of whether a player wins or loses in the competition. Such interactions include diverse phenomena such as marketing and advertising by firms, litigation, relative reward schemes in firms, political competition, patent races, sports, military combat, war and civil war. These have been studied in the field of contest theory both within these specific contexts and at a higher level of abstraction. The purpose of this book is to describe the fundamental common properties of these types of interactions and to uncover some common properties or laws that govern them. The book begins by describing the properties of static contests and tournaments. Aspects such as timing, entry, sabotage and delegation are added and contest design issues such as the admission or exclusion of players and the structure of prizes are discussed. Further, structures are analysed in which players interact repeatedly in the same or different contest environments. Examples are inter-group conflict followed by intra-group rivalry, elimination tournaments and other dynamic contest structures.

By:  
Imprint:   Oxford University Press
Country of Publication:   United Kingdom
Dimensions:   Height: 234mm,  Width: 155mm,  Spine: 15mm
Weight:   347g
ISBN:   9780199549603
ISBN 10:   0199549605
Series:   London School of Economics Perspectives in Economic Analysis
Pages:   232
Publication Date:  
Audience:   College/higher education ,  A / AS level ,  Further / Higher Education
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Preface and Acknowledgements 1: An Introduction to Contests 1.1 A definition 1.2 Examples 1.3 The structure of the book 2: Types of Contests 2.1 The first-price all-pay auction 2.2 Additive noise 2.3 The Tullock contest 2.4 Experimental evidence 2.5 Evolutionary success 2.6 Summary 3: Timing and Participation 3.1 Endogenous timing 3.2 Voluntary participation 3.3 Exclusion 3.4 Delegation 3.5 Summary 4: Cost and prize structure 4.1 Choice of cost 4.2 The structure of prizes 4.3 Endogenous prizes 4.4 Summary 5: Externalities 5.1 State lotteries and financing public goods 5.2 A loser's preference about who wins 5.3 Personnel economics and sabotage 5.4 Information externalities and campaigning 5.5 Inter-group contests and free riding 5.6 Conclusions 6: Nested contests 6.1 Exogenous sharing rules 6.2 The choice of sharing rules 6.3 Intra-group conflict 6.4 A strategy of analysis of nested contests 7: Alliances 7.1 The alliance formation puzzle 7.2 Solutions to the alliance formation puzzle 7.3 Summary 8: Dynamic battles 8.1 The elimination tournament 8.2 The race 8.3 The tug-of-war 8.4 Iterating incumbency fights 8.5 Endogenous fighting 8.6 Summary: the discouragement effect 9: Conclusions

Kai A. Konrad completed his Ph.D. in Economics in 1990 at the University of Munich. He has held teaching and research positions at the universities of Munich, Bonn and Bergen and at the University of California, Irvine. He currently holds a chair in Public Finance at the Free University of Berlin and is also a Director of a research unit at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB). He is a Co-Editor of the Journal of Public Economics and on the editorial boards of several other journals. His research interests are focused on contests, conflict and tournaments in various institutional contexts.

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