Out of Hitler's Shadow: Debt, Guilt, and the German Economic Miracle

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Tobias Straumann (Professor of Modern and Economic History, Professor of Modern and Economic History, University of Zurich)

Out of Hitler's Shadow

Debt, Guilt, and the German Economic Miracle

Tobias Straumann (Professor of Modern and Economic History, Professor of Modern and Economic History, University of Zurich)

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English

Oxford University Press
04 January 2026

Why were the United States and its Western Allies so lenient after the most atrocious war of all times? Out of Hitler's Shadow answers this question, and considers why the Allies concluded that imposing unrealistic financial conditions on a defeated country would do more harm than good.

The destruction left by Nazi Germany was horrendous. The occupied countries had been ravaged and plundered, millions of people murdered, cities laid in ashes. There was every reason to make the defeated Germans pay for 'Hitler's debt' as The New York Times called the gigantic damage inflicted. But whereas the Soviet Union punished East Germany, the Western Allies, at the London Debt Conference (1952) decided to forgo all war-related debts. The Federal Republic of Germany - the Western successor state of Nazi Germany - had to settle no more than half of all outstanding debts stemming from pre-war obligations and post-war assistance. Only Israel and private Jewish organisations received reparations from the Federal Republic, but it was a modest amount.

Why were the United States and its Western Allies so lenient after the most atrocious war of all times? Out of Hitler's Shadow answers this question, and considers why the Allies concluded that imposing unrealistic financial conditions on a defeated country would do more harm than good.

These actions challenged widely held notions of justice. People who had suffered most from the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany were not compensated. The deal was unfair in many ways, but diplomats and politicians had to make hard choices. Five statesmen were particularly bold: U.S. Secretary of State Acheson, German Chancellor Adenauer, French Foreign Minister Schuman as well as Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Foreign Minister Sharett. Tobias Straumann explains why the personalities involved deserve to be remembered for their strategic clarity in the face of enormous resistance.

By: Tobias Straumann (Professor of Modern and Economic History Professor of Modern and Economic History University of Zurich)
Imprint: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions: Height: 224mm, Width: 146mm, Spine: 30mm
Weight: 419g
ISBN: 9780192849519
ISBN 10: 0192849514
Pages: 288
Publication Date: 04 January 2026
Audience: General/trade , College/higher education , ELT Advanced , Further / Higher Education
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Forthcoming

List of Figures List of Illustrations List of Tables Introduction PART I: THE PLAN 1: Hitler's Debt 2: A French Surprise 3: Breakthrough a the Waldorf PART II: A DIFFICULT START 4: Stubborn Germans 5: Saving Germany from bankruptcy PART III: COLLUSION 6: A Secret Meeting in Paris 7: Finding the Right Words PART IV: COLLISION 8: The Soul of Israel 9: 'Adding insult to injury' PART V: THE GRAND BARGAIN 10: 'What do we do now?' 11: German Reparations to Israel 12: The Settlement of Hitler's Debt Conclusion References

Tobias Straumann is a professor of modern and economic history at the University of Zurich. He studied in Berkeley, Bielefeld, Paris and Zurich and held visiting positions at the University of Lausanne, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the University of Oxford. He has published widely on the financial and monetary history of the twentieth century, including 1931: Debt, Crisis, and the Rise of Hitler(OUP, 2019).