Margin of Victory

"Macgregor makes many profound recommendations based on significant historical evidence. This is a must-read for strategic leaders seeking ideas on military reform. In what I have read about future strategy and the defense innovation (including the Third Offset), few to none of Macgregor’s proposals are being considered. The focus is on technology improvements—mostly in regard to ISR and autonomous systems—and not the fundamental changes Macgregor champions. They deserve serious consideration.""—Joint Force Quarterly ""Douglas Macgregor’s latest book combines masterful campaign studies and thoughtful analysis of their long-term implications for today’s military establishments.""—The Journal of Military History ""This book is most highly recommended to all…. With America’s Army (and sister services) engaged in heavy debate and frenzied activity on what we need to face the unknowable future, reflected in the activation of the new Army Futures Command, Multi-Domain Operations, the inception of Space Command, and the impact of the new realm of cyber warfare to name a few, Doug Macgregor has continued to offer us more than food for thought. Indeed, he may well have his fingers firmly on the pulse of what we must do to succeed, coupled with an insight and level of experience shared by few.""—Public Intelligence Blog ""The challenge is for a nation’s military system to successfully adapt to changes in warfare. Although seemingly disparate, these battles are linked together with a logical theme, which makes for an informative and thought-provoking work.""—Military Heritage ""In Margin of Victory, Macgregor includes the Battle of Mons in 1914, the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, The Red Army’s destruction of Germany’s Army Group Center in 1944, the Israeli Defense Force’s counter-attack across the Suez Canal in 1973, and the Battle of ‘73 Easting in 1991. The reason for the selection of these battles is that each shows the imbalance between victor and vanquished had roots in the reforms that the victorious side enacted well before the war began. Macgregor wants the U.S. to begin a serious study of what it lacks in dealing with 21st century war in order to avoid finding out too late that its solutions are not adequate to provide victory.""—U.S. Military History Review ""What does it take to win a war? West Pointer, combat leader, and renowned military thinker Douglas Macgregor answers that question in this engaging look at five major battles during the last century of combat: Mons 1914, Shanghai 1937, Belorussia 1944, Suez 1973, and Iraq 1991. You may not yet know much about these great clashes, but when you read this book, you will. More than that, you’ll know just what it takes to fight and win.""—Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA (Ret.), author of Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars ""Douglas Macgregor has a brave tank commander's perspective on modern warfare and a restless refusal to accept the status quo when soldiers must pay for their officers' lack of higher critical thinking or preparation for combat. By revisiting five major battles of the past hundred years he shows in moving detail how a mixture of foresight and failure to plan ahead impacted the fates not only of soldiers' lives, but of whole nations. A salutary—and wonderfully readable—lesson for us all today.""—Nigel Hamilton, author of The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941-1942 ""Margin of Victory is a worthy read with several well-considered recommendations that will prompt critical thinking and debate among senior military leaders and others in the defense community about how we fight—and what it might take to win the next war.""—Parameters ""All told, however, Macgregor has written another powerful critique of the American way of planning and developing strategy for war. His lesson for policy makers and strategists alike is that 'whenever new military concepts and technologies appear, the complex interaction of national culture, bureaucratic interests, and economic power does not automatically work to support them. . . .[W]hen conditions change and the margin of victory suddenly narrows, frailties and vulnerabilities concealed from view inside the armed forces . . . suddenly produce catastrophic failure.' He asserts that Washington needs to focus on its long-standing and still primary strategic concern, namely, prevention of a hostile power from dominating the Eurasian lands. He argues that the American military must increase its force levels, notably those of the Army. And he advocates for the creation of what he terms a 'national defense staff' (in other words, a general staff) 'to guide the application of American military power,' encompassing integrated capabilities across service lines.""—Naval War College Review ""Macgregor opines that the United States has foolishly taken on the role of ‘global policeman,’ and that in the modern environment the resources for an American margin of victory are ‘thinner than ever.’ Faulty decisions by policy makers, organizing for the last war instead of the next, and failing to heed changes in technology are all pitfalls that can lessen the margin of victory. The case studies presented here have been carefully researched, are well written and expertly analyzed. Whether or not they support Macgregor’s thesis of current shortsighted American defense policy is left to the reader’s judgment.""Journal of America’s Military Past ""Macgregor offers guidance for future conflicts, stressing the importance of strategy and geopolitics over ideology if nations are to effectively fight and win future battles.""—Military History ""Margin of Victory is an extraordinarily informed and informative study that is unreservedly recommended for personal, community and academic library Military History collections and supplemental studies reading lists.""—Midwest Book Review ""Douglas Macgregor’s superb analysis points to a wholesale restructuring of the American military—a general staff and cadre of officers with lifetime expertise in such issues as cyber warfare or distinct third-world regions and cultures, not cookie cutter products trained to fill slots to refight World War II.""—Jon Basil Utley, publisher, The American Conservative ""Margin of Victory is highly scholarly study of five battles that changed the way future wars would be fought. It gives deep insight into the changing face of modern war. Douglas Macgregor powerfully argues the United States should give attention to reshaping its war strategies, organization, structure, technology, and leadership to avoid any defeat in the future. It will equally benefit students and experts of war, as well as those who actually fight.""—The Washington Book Review ""Margin of Victory is a superbly original and readable book. In brilliant accounts of five exemplary twentieth-century battles, Col. Douglas Macgregor shows how shaping armies and their doctrines to meet the challenges of past rather than future warfare produces defeat and how organizing and equipping forces for the future can bring victory. Margin of Victory will be given close attention by America’s competitors overseas. Those responsible for organizing and directing the adaptation of the U.S. military to emerging realities need to give it equal attention.""—Ambassador Chas W. Freeman Jr., United States Foreign Service (Ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield and Desert Storm ""It is a measure of Douglas Macgregor's power as an analyst, historian, and writer that even readers who differ with some of his conclusions will enjoy and learn from his argument. This is the rare book on military policy that is both interesting and important.""—James Fallows, correspondent for The Atlantic and author of Blind Into Baghdad: America’s War in Iraq ""Douglas Macgregor, one of our finest military visionaries and reformers, has written a stirring account of five battles of twentieth-century warfare of great historical importance. Margin of Victory compellingly illustrates the need for nations to understand and apply both strategy and geopolitics before engaging in military action in this new age, where the guiding principles have changed dramatically.""—Carlo D’Este, author of Patton: A Genius for War"