Lawmaking under Authoritarianism: Factions, Institutions, and Outcomes Across Dictatorships

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Alejandro Bonvecchi (Torcuato Di Tella University) Emilia Simison (Queen Mary University of London)

Lawmaking under Authoritarianism

Name: Lawmaking under Authoritarianism
Price: 250.53 AUD
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ISBN: 9781009676274

Factions, Institutions, and Outcomes Across Dictatorships

Alejandro Bonvecchi (Torcuato Di Tella University), Emilia Simison (Queen Mary University of London)

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Hardback

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English

Cambridge University Press
05 March 2026

Comparative politics; Political structures: totalitarianism & dictatorship; Political economy

Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain.

By: Alejandro Bonvecchi (Torcuato Di Tella University), Emilia Simison (Queen Mary University of London)
Imprint: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Weight: 620g
ISBN: 9781009676274
ISBN 10: 100967627X
Pages: 314
Publication Date: 05 March 2026
Audience: College/higher education , Further / Higher Education
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active

1. Introduction; 2. Power-sharing, institutional design, and the performance of legislatures in authoritarian regimes; 3. Analyzing lawmaking in autocratic regimes; 4. Argentina: a balanced factional politics and a reviser legislature; 5. Spain: an unbalanced factional politics and a notary legislature; 6. Brazil: changing patterns in an oscillating case; 7. Conclusion-lawmaking under authoritarianism: contributions and implications; Appendix; References; Index.

Alejandro Bonvecchi is Professor of Political Science at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. He is also an Independent Researcher at the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). His work focuses on the political economy of decision-making in legislatures and executives about economic and social policies. Emilia Simison is Lecturer in Latin American Politics at Queen Mary University of London. Her research focuses on the comparative political economy of policymaking and policy change under both authoritarian and democratic regimes.