A wide-ranging engagement with one of contemporary epistemology's most influential thinkers
Hilary Kornblith is one of the world's leading philosophers theorizing about knowledge and related issues. A key figure in the naturalized epistemology tradition, Kornblith integrates traditional empiricism with contemporary cognitive science, rejecting inward-looking, first-person approaches in favor of a third-person, scientifically grounded perspective on mind and knowledge.
Kornblith's contributions have reshaped debates about the nature and structure of knowledge, justification, and epistemic normativity; he has challenged the legitimacy of conceptual analysis and the reliability of reflection and reasoning, besides charting and defending a mature and self-consciously naturalistic philosophical methodology. By exploring this terrain, Kornblith and His Critics offers an in-depth examination of some of the most unique and innovative work in the last 40 years of anglophone epistemology.
This volume brings together fifteen original essays by leading philosophers engaging with Kornblith's work, each written specifically for this collection. Organized into three main thematic sections – Knowledge and Justification, Reflection and Inference, and Naturalism and Methodology – the collection systematically traces and tests the implications of Kornblith's work across key debates. The volume also includes a substantial reply from Kornblith, offering his own response to the critical challenges raised by the incisive contributions.
Kornblith and His Critics is ideal for graduate and advanced undergraduate philosophy students, especially those taking a variety of courses on epistemology and philosophical methodology. Key features include:
A complete and detailed overview of how Kornblith's work compares with, and contributes to, key debates in epistemology. Cutting-edge engagement with the foundations, nature, and future of naturalized epistemology. Thorough discussion of core issues in epistemology: from the nature of knowledge, justification, and inference to the epistemic value of reflection and conceptual analysis. A lengthy and unique reply by Hilary Kornblith, directly addressing the critical challenges raised by the incisive contributions. A systematic and thematic structure for easy integration into graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses.
Kornblith and His Critics is a vital resource for researchers and instructors within philosophy programs in both MA and PhD curricula, as well as general readers interested in post-analytic and empirically-informed philosophy.
List of Contributors vii Acknowledgements xi Introduction: On Hilary Kornblith’s Epistemology xii Joshua DiPaolo and Luis R.G. Oliveira Section 1 Knowledge and Justification 1 1 Knowledge of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature 3 Daniel Greco 2 Kornblith, Naturalism, Relativism 21 Martin Kusch and Robin McKenna 3 On the “Arguments-On-Paper” View of Epistemic Justification 39 Juan Comesaña 4 Logic: It’s Not Just a Good Idea; It’s the Law 55 David Christensen 5 Epistemological Detente? 72 Catherine Z. Elgin Section 2 Reflection and Inference 87 6 Reflection, Confabulation, and Reasoning 89 Jennifer Nagel 7 Reflection Without Reification 107 Berislav Marušić 8 Easy Knowledge, Junk Knowledge; Knowledge Nonetheless? 120 Katia Vavova 9 Reasons and Their Place in Nature 139 Tricia Magalotti 10 Inference, Taking, and Reason-Responsiveness 158 Section 3 Naturalism and Methodology 181 11 Naturalized Epistemic Oughts 183 Mona Simion 12 Kornblith on Epistemic Normativity 200 Matthew McGrath 13 Armchair Philosophy and Naturalized Epistemology 215 Ernest Sosa 14 Naturalistic Function-First Epistemology 226 Georgi Gardiner 15 How Much Does Knowledge Matter? Reality, Representation, and the Aims of Epistemology 248 Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett Section 4 Replies 273 16 Replies to My Critics 275 Appendix: Hilary Kornblith’s Publications 297 Index 000
Joshua DiPaolo is Associate Professor of Philosophy at California State University Fullerton. He specializes in ethics and epistemology, with research focused on epistemic dependence, extremism, and evidential standards. His work has appeared in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese. Luis R.G. Oliveira is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Houston. His areas of expertise include epistemic normativity and the philosophy of religion. He is the editor or co-editor of Common Sense Metaphysics, Propositional and Doxastic Justification, and Externalism About Knowledge.
