The journalist William Howard Russell (1820–1907) is sometimes regarded as being the first war correspondent, and his reports from the conflict in the Crimea are also credited with being a cause of reforms made to the British military system. This 1865 book began as a review in The Times of the five-volume work of General Eduard Todleben (or Totleben), the military engineer and Russian Army General, whose work in creating and continually adapting the land defences of Sevastopol in 1854–5 made him a hero and enabled the fortress to hold out against British bombardment for a whole year. Russell added extracts from the original book to his review, and enlarged his commentary on the Russian text, producing a thorough and accurate synthesis, but always highlighting the central importance of the Russian work to any student of the history of the Sevastopol siege.
By:
William Howard Russell Imprint: Cambridge University Press Country of Publication: United Kingdom Dimensions:
Height: 216mm,
Width: 140mm,
Spine: 19mm
Weight: 430g ISBN:9781108044684 ISBN 10: 1108044689 Series:Cambridge Library Collection - Naval and Military History Pages: 340 Publication Date:22 March 2012 Audience:
Professional and scholarly
,
Undergraduate
Format:Paperback Publisher's Status: Active
Preface; 1. Our first victories; 2. The early and late histories; 3. The Russian history; 4. The march of Russia; 5. The ascent of the Czars; 6. Menschikoff's mission; 7. Declaration of war; 8. Siege of Silistria; 9. Defenceless Russia; 10. The Russian armies; 11. The forces of the Allies; 12. The condition of Sebastopol; 13. The state of Sebastopol; 14. Menschikoff surprised; 15. Selection of the Alma; 16. The choice of landing-places; 17. The night before the battle; 18. The Russian position; 19. The English order of battle; 20. The Russian left engaged; 21. Canrobert and Bosquet; 22. The English begin to move; 23. A check to the French; 24. The English on the right; 25. The English fire; 26. The capture of the Epaulement; 27. The second attack on the Epaulement; 28. Retreat of the Wladimir Regiment; 29. The retreat of the Russians; 30. Russian reasons for their defeat; 31. Causes of the defeat; 32. Delay after victory; 33. Condition of Sebastopol; 34. The works of Sebastopol; 35. Menschikoff's flank march; 36. The sinking of the fleet; 37. The Allies on the Belbeck; 38. State of the North Fort; 39. The flank march; 40. Manschikoff's flank march; 41. Sir John Burgoyne's vindications; 42. Sir John Burgoyne's remarks; 43. Sir John Burgoyne's policy; 44. An advance northward; 45. Surrender of Balaklava; 46. State of the north side; 47. Preparations to resist; 48. Reinforcements for Sebastopol; 49. Korniloff's influence; 50. The first trench opened; 51. The new works; 52. Opposite the English; 53. The English works; 54. Reasons for and against an assault; 55. The first day's fire; 56. The Russians recover spirits; 57. The French again succumb; 58. The economy of Matériel; 59. The actions before Balaklava; 60. Rout of the Turks; 61. The first Russian advance; 62. The light cavalry; 63. The French chasseurs; 64. The results of the action; 65. The effect at Sebastopol; 66. 'Little Inkerman'; 67. General Sir De Lacy Evans' despatch; 68. The French batteries; 69. Peril of the flagstaff bastion; 70. Probable issue of an assault; 71. The opposing forces; 72. The allied strength and position; 73. The nature of the ground; 74. Dispositions for Inkerman; 75. Soïmonoff's advance; 76. Attack the camp; 77. Attack Adams's Brigade; 78. The precision of the British fire; 79. Retreat of the 17th Division; 80. The relative numbers; 81. Dannenberg's advance; 82. The Guards rally; 83. Cathcart's disaster; 84. The artillery conflict; 85. The French are summoned; 86. The Russians defeated; 87. The pursuit; 88. Escape of the Russian artillery; 89. The losses; 90. The superiority of English fire-arms; 91. Close of the first period of the siege; 92. The Redan and the British; 93. Moral effect of Inkerman; 94. The great storm; 95. Russian philanthropists; 96. Good Samaritans; 97. The winter begins; 98. British insouciance; 99. The rifle pits; 100. Increase of lodgements; 101. Comparison between French and English; 102. Information to the enemy; 103. The Russian commissariat; 104. The chaos of Balaklava; 105. Russian supplies; 106. Russian transport; 107. Cost of the war; 108. The war of mines; 109. The French take our light attack; 110. Fears for Perekop; 111. Attack on Eupatoria; 112. Todleben's opinion of our troops; 113. The result of delay; 114. Want of forethought; 115. Concluding remarks; Appendices.
