An introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations.
An introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations.
This introductory text on game theory provides students with both the theoretical tools to analyze situations through the logic of game theory and the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. It is unique among game theory texts in offering a clear, formal introduction to standard game theory while incorporating evidence from experimental data and introducing recent behavioral models. Students will not only learn about incentives, how to represent situations as games, and what agents ""should"" do in these situations, but they will also be presented with evidence that either confirms the theoretical assumptions or suggests a way in which the theory might be updated.
Features-
Each chapter begins with a motivating example that can be run as an experiment and ends with a discussion of the behavior in the example.
Parts I-IV cover the fundamental ""nuts and bolts"" of any introductory game theory course, including the theory of games, simple games with simultaneous decision making by players, sequential move games, and incomplete information in simultaneous and sequential move games.
Parts V-VII apply the tools developed in previous sections to bargaining, cooperative game theory, market design, social dilemmas, and social choice and voting.
Part VIII offers a more in-depth discussion of behavioral game theory models including evolutionary and psychological game theory. Instructor resources include solutions to end-of-chapter exercises, worksheets for running each chapter's experimental games using pencil and paper, and the oTree codes for running the games online.
By:
Jeffrey Carpenter, Andrea Robbett Imprint: MIT Press Country of Publication: United States Dimensions:
Height: 229mm,
Width: 203mm,
Weight: 567g ISBN:9780262047296 ISBN 10: 0262047292 Pages: 768 Publication Date:24 January 2023 Audience:
General/trade
,
ELT Advanced
Format:Hardback Publisher's Status: Active
Preface xvii Acknowledgments xxi I Introduction to the Theory of Games 1 Games of Strategy 3 2 Game Representations 19 II Solving Games 3 Dominated Strategies 41 4 Equilibrium 65 5 Mixed Strategies 85 6 Equilibrium in Nonmatrix Games 107 7 Equilibrium Selection 137 III Analyzing Sequential-Move Games 8 Subgame Perfection 161 9 Finitely Repeated Games 183 10 Infinitely Repeated Games 205 IV Incomplete Information 11 Simultaneous Games of Incomplete Information 225 12 Signaling: Sequential Games of Incomplete Information 245 13 Auctions 277 V Bargaining and Cooperative Game Theory 14 Non-cooperative Bargaining 307 15 Cooperative Bargaining 331 16 Cooperative Game Theory 347 17 Matching Market Design 371 VI Social Dilemmas 18 Social Dilemmas 397 19 Public Goods 411 20 Common Pool Resources 427 VII Social Choice and Voting 21 Social Choice 453 22 The Paradox of Voting 491 23 Voting with Private Information 511 VIII Behavioral Extensions of Standard Theory 24 Belief-Based Learning 533 25 Evolutionary Game Theory 545 26 Quantal Response Equilibrium 575 27 Level-k Reasoning 597 28 Psychological Game Theory 619 Appendix 645 References 661 Index 679
Jeffrey Carpenter is James Jermain Professor of Political Economy at Middlebury College. Andrea Robbett is Associate Professor in the Economics Department at Middlebury College.