Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.
By:
Charles W. Calomiris,
Stephen Haber
Imprint: Princeton University Pres
Country of Publication: United States
Dimensions:
Height: 235mm,
Width: 152mm,
Spine: 37mm
Weight: 907g
ISBN: 9780691155241
ISBN 10: 0691155240
Series: The Princeton Economic History of the Western World
Pages: 624
Publication Date: 06 May 2014
Audience:
College/higher education
,
College/higher education
,
Further / Higher Education
,
Primary
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
Preface ix SECTION ONE No Banks without States, and No States without Banks 1 If Stable and Effi cient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? 3 2 The Game of Bank Bargains 27 3 Tools of Conquest and Survival: Why States Need Banks 60 4 Privileges with Burdens: War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking 84 5 Banks and Democracy: Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 105 SECTION TWO The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances: The United States versus Canada 6 Crippled by Populism: U.S. Banking from Colonial Times to 1990 153 7 The New U.S. Bank Bargain: Megabanks, Urban Activists, and the Erosion of Mortgage Standards 203 8 Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis 256 9 Durable Partners: Politics and Banking in Canada 283 SECTION THREE Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains 10 Mexico: Chaos Makes Cronyism Look Good 331 11 When Autocracy Fails: Banking and Politics in Mexico since 1982 366 12 Infl ation Machines: Banking and State Finance in Imperial Brazil 390 13 The Democratic Consequences of Infl ation-Tax Banking in Brazil 415 SECTION FOUR Going beyond Structural Narratives 14 Traveling to Other Places: Is Our Sample Representative? 451 15 Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses 479 References 507 Index 549
Charles W. Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions at Columbia Business School and a professor at Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs. His many books include U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective . Stephen H. Haber is the A. A. and Jeanne Welch Milligan Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His many books include The Politics of Property Rights .
Reviews for Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit
Brilliant... [I]f you are looking for a rich history of banking over the last couple of centuries and the role played by politics in that evolution, there is no better study. It deserves to become a classic. --Liaquat Ahamed, New York Times Book Review Business economists Calomiris and Haber explain how imperfectly politics and commercial banks intersect, and the consequences for the rest of us... This learned inquiry deserves ample attention from scholars, regulators, and bankers themselves. --Publishers Weekly Calomiris and Haber offer a thoughtful counter-argument to the current received wisdom. --Howard Davies, Times Higher Education Readable, erudite, myth-busting... The authors' clear and well-documented discussion of what happened should dissuade anyone of the myth that the economic crisis of 2007-09 was caused by the profit-and-loss system of unfettered capitalism. --Gene Epstein, Barron's Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber make the compelling argument that a country's propensity for frequent banking crises is linked to the ability of populist elements to hold the banking sector to ransom. --Louise Bennetts, American Banker This is a great history of political interference in bank regulation ... --James Ferguson, Money Week One reason why economists did not see the financial crisis coming is that the models most macro and financial economists deal in are free of politics. Fragile by Design offers a much-needed supplement. --Martin Sandbu, Financial Times Will a next crisis be averted? Perhaps, if our regulators read this book. --Vicky Pryce, The Independent Fragile by Design ... is a great book... [E]normously illuminating, and contains the most powerful and concise account of the causes of the 2008 crisis that I have seen. --Eric Posner, EricPosner.com
- Long-listed for Financial Times and McKinsey Business Book of the Year Award 2014
- Long-listed for Financial Times and McKinsey Business Book of the Year Award 2014.
- Short-listed for Bloomberg Businessweek 's Best Books of 2014 2014
- Short-listed for Financial Times (FT.com) Best Economics Books, chosen by Martin Wolf 2014
- Short-listed for The Times Higher Education Supplement 's Books of the Year 2014
- Winner of PROSE Award in Business, Finance & Management, Association of American Publishers 2015
- Winner of PROSE Awards: Business, Finance & Management 2015.