A unique first-hand account of the planning and execution of the opening campaign in the invasion of Iraq.
Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003.
He addresses the persistent trope that the Army did no planning for Phase IV, revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the smoking gun of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings.
AUTHOR: Kevin Benson served in the US Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment in the US Army was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He writes for professional journals and web sites ranging from Parameters, Military Review, and ARMY magazine to Strategy Bridge and the Modern War Institute. He reviews books for ARMY magazine.
By:
Kevin C.M. Benson,
Vincent Brooks
Imprint: Casemate Publishers
Country of Publication: United States
Dimensions:
Height: 229mm,
Width: 152mm,
ISBN: 9781636244266
ISBN 10: 1636244262
Pages: 304
Publication Date: 15 May 2024
Audience:
Professional and scholarly
,
Undergraduate
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
1. Introduction: Cold War, Hot Wars, Peace Dividends 2. Planning the Invasion to D-Day 3. Build up to D-Day 4. Planning While Fighting March 2003 5. April In Iraq 6. Off Ramps and Phase IV 7. Building the Coalition May 2003 8. A Bad Feeling 9. Concluding Thoughts
Kevin Benson served in the US Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment in the US Army was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He writes for professional journals and web sites ranging from Parameters, Military Review, and ARMY magazine to Strategy Bridge and the Modern War Institute. He reviews books for ARMY magazine.
Reviews for Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraq War
"""Of all the many mistakes the United States made in invading Iraq, none was as damning as the mishandling of postwar security and reconstruction. The place to start to understand that fiasco is with Kevin Benson's Expectation of Valor. No one is better placed to do so as Benson led the U.S. Army's planning team for the invasion and its aftermath. It was their plan that was disregarded and that could have led to a far better outcome had it been followed. In these pages, Benson explains how that plan was crafted, the obstacles it faced, and how it was ultimately ignored. It is a story both fascinating and tragic, and all too important.""--Kenneth M. Pollack, former CIA Persian Gulf military analyst and author of ""Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness"""