William F. Owen (Wilf) served for 12 years in the British Army in regular and reserve Infantry and Intelligence units. He then worked on defence advisory and security projects in West Africa and the Far East before moving to writing and editing on defence matters. In 2010, he co-founded Military Strategy Magazine, for which he is currently editor. He also worked as a consultant and contractor for the British Army and several defence agencies and companies worldwide.
""Owen's monumental effort delivers a pragmatic, insightful guide to modern military preparedness for Western armies facing similar dilemmas. It offers practical, budget-conscious strategies for equipping, training, and organizing ground forces, emphasizing adaptability and operational utility over speculative future scenarios"". Major General (Ret.) Bengo Yacov Ph.D, Commander of the IDF's Northern Corps and the Multi-Domain Joint Maneuver Array in the Ground Forces. ""A searing and authentic account of amongst other things the realities of warfare in the third decade of the 21st Century and the fractured relationship between Military Thought and Military Science. It is testing reading in places and the author is fearless in his challenge of conventional military thinking. It is for these reasons that it should be essential reading for those charged with preparing for war"". Lt Gen Mike Elviss CB MBE, Commander Field Army “Amid so much breathless commentary on military tech, Wilf Owen yet again cuts through the din with clear-eyed, practical, and resilient recommendations. His analysis is rooted in hard realities and timeless conceptions. A book for soldiers, written by a soldier. Read it and be reminded of the rules that decide wars, not wargames”. Major General Alex Turner, Director Futures, British Army Euclid’s Army is not meant to be the final word on force design. Rather, it is a call to debate. In that sense, it succeeds brilliantly. By challenging orthodoxy, Owen reopens questions that many assume are settled. Do we need ever-heavier infantry vehicles? Are complex systems a liability in expeditionary warfare? How much training time is wasted on activities with no combat value? These are questions that every military professional and defence thinker should grapple with. The Wavell Room