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Discovering Prices

Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints

Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

$47.95

Hardback

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English
Columbia University Press
23 May 2017
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith's famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What's needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied.

In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom-the world's most frequently cited academic expert on auction design-describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world's growing complex resource-allocation problems.

By:  
Imprint:   Columbia University Press
Country of Publication:   United States
Dimensions:   Height: 216mm,  Width: 140mm,  Spine: 23mm
Weight:   417g
ISBN:   9780231175982
ISBN 10:   0231175981
Series:   Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series
Pages:   248
Publication Date:  
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Undergraduate
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active

Paul Milgrom is the Shirley and Leonard Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. His books include Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004) and Economics, Organization, and Management (1992). He has also written dozens of articles on auction design, game theory, and macro- and microeconomics.

Reviews for Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints

No one has greater knowledge or, perhaps more importantly, more reliable instincts when it comes to incentive auction design. Milgrom's excellent monograph should be made available to economists as soon as possible. -- Leslie Marx, Duke University


  • Winner of Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2020

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