Alliances & Armor: Communist Diplomacy and Armored Warfare during the War in Vietnam

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Jim Pomeroy

Alliances & Armor

Communist Diplomacy and Armored Warfare during the War in Vietnam

Jim Pomeroy

$59.99

Hardback

Forthcoming
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English

Casemate Publishers
01 May 2025

Vietnam War; Diplomacy; Defence strategy, planning & research

How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War.

The People's Army of Vietnamese's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi.

As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War.

As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach détente with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed Easter Offensive in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon.

AUTHOR: Jim Pomeroy has a BA in History & Political Science from James Madison University and a Master's in History with a Master's Certificate in Strategic Studies from Texas Tech University. He has also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Congressional staffer. He currently lives in Roanoke, VA.

By: Jim Pomeroy
Imprint: Casemate Publishers
Country of Publication: United States
Dimensions: Height: 229mm, Width: 152mm,
ISBN: 9781636245362
ISBN 10: 1636245366
Pages: 174
Publication Date: 01 May 2025
Audience: General/trade , ELT Advanced
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Forthcoming

Jim Pomeroy has a BA in History & Political Science from James Madison University and a Master's in History with a Master's Certificate in Strategic Studies from Texas Tech University. He has also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Congressional staffer. He currently lives in Roanoke, VA.

Reviews for Alliances & Armor: Communist Diplomacy and Armored Warfare during the War in Vietnam

""Jim Pomeroy's newest book provides a comprehensive understanding to key schisms and events within the communist world, shaping events on the battlefield. He painstakingly examines Vietnam's military history and diplomatic history and, in doing so, efficiently and effectively connects these important topics.""--Ken Rutherford, Professor of Political Science, James Madison University and co-founder of the Landmine Survivors Network, co-recipient of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize as part of the global international campaign to ban landmines ""Alliances & Armor thoughtfully synthesizes the evolution of Hanoi's military strategy in the Vietnam War and beyond. It offers particularly trenchant insights on the shift to Soviet-style warfare during the latter stages of the conflict.""--Pierre Asselin, Professor of History and Dwight E. Stanford Chair in US Foreign Relations