Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism.
How can the baffling problems of phenomenal experience be accounted for? In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of which the mind does its job. One must understand what the mind's job is and how this task can be performed by a physical system-the nervous system.
Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. * Not for sale in France or Belgium.
By:
Fred Dretske Edited by:
Tom Roeper (University of Massachusetts) Imprint: MIT Press Country of Publication: United States Edition: New edition Volume: 1994 Dimensions:
Height: 201mm,
Width: 132mm,
Spine: 13mm
Weight: 295g ISBN:9780262540896 ISBN 10: 0262540894 Series:Jean Nicod Lectures Pages: 224 Publication Date:21 August 1997 Recommended Age: From 18 Audience:
College/higher education
,
Professional and scholarly
,
Professional & Vocational
,
A / AS level
,
Further / Higher Education
Format:Paperback Publisher's Status: Active
The representational character of sense experience; introspection; qualia; consciousness; externalism and supervenience.
Fred Dretske is Senior Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy, Duke University.