A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics

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Karen Neander (Professor, Duke University) Robert A. Wilson, PhD (University of Alberta)

A Mark of the Mental

In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics

Karen Neander (Professor, Duke University), Robert A. Wilson, PhD (University of Alberta), Kim Sterelny (Professor, Australian National University)

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English

MIT Press
16 June 2017

Philosophy of mind

Series: Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology

Drawing on insights from causal theories of reference, teleosemantics, and state space semantics, a theory of naturalized mental representation.

In A Mark of the Mental, Karen Neander considers the representational power of mental states-described by the cognitive scientist Zenon Pylyshyn as the ""second hardest puzzle"" of philosophy of mind (the first being consciousness). The puzzle at the heart of the book is sometimes called ""the problem of mental content,"" ""Brentano's problem,"" or ""the problem of intentionality."" Its motivating mystery is how neurobiological states can have semantic properties such as meaning or reference. Neander proposes a naturalistic account for sensory-perceptual (nonconceptual) representations.

Neander draws on insights from state-space semantics (which appeals to relations of second-order similarity between representing and represented domains), causal theories of reference (which claim the reference relation is a causal one), and teleosemantic theories (which claim that semantic norms, at their simplest, depend on functional norms). She proposes and defends an intuitive, theoretically well-motivated but highly controversial thesis- sensory-perceptual systems have the function to produce inner state changes that are the analogs of as well as caused by their referents. Neander shows that the three main elements-functions, causal-information relations, and relations of second-order similarity-complement rather than conflict with each other. After developing an argument for teleosemantics by examining the nature of explanation in the mind and brain sciences, she develops a theory of mental content and defends it against six main content-determinacy challenges to a naturalized semantics.

By: Karen Neander (Professor Duke University)
Series edited by: Robert A. Wilson PhD (University of Alberta), Kim Sterelny (Professor, Australian National University)
Imprint: MIT Press
Country of Publication: United States
Dimensions: Height: 229mm, Width: 152mm, Spine: 17mm
ISBN: 9780262036146
ISBN 10: 0262036142
Series: Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology
Pages: 344
Publication Date: 16 June 2017
Recommended Age: From 18 years
Audience: Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active

Karen Neander is Professor of Philosophy at Duke University.

Reviews for A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics

Neander's excellent book should be studied by cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind and biology working on representation and intentionality. —Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews