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Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties

Explaining Corporate Governance Change in Europe

Roger M. Barker (, Head of Corporate Governance, Institute of Directors)

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Hardback

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English
Oxford University Press
01 January 2010
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g. the US and the UK). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. Business strategy has focused on the achievement of social stability - taking into account the interests of a broad group stakeholders - rather than the maximisation of shareholder value. However, since the mid-1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Anglo-American shareholder model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder-orientation has coincided with a significant role for the Left in European government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not usually conceive of the Left as an enthusiastic proponent of pro-shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this paradox by examining how economic factors have interacted with the policy preferences of political parties to cause a significant change in the European system of corporate governance. This book argues that the post-war support of the European Left for the prevailing blockholder-dominated corporate system depended on the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with employees, both through higher wages and greater employment stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In such an environment, the Left relinquished its traditional social partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the shareholder model. This explanation is supported through a panel data econometric analysis of 15 non-liberal market economies. Subsequent case study chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate governance change in Germany and Italy.
By:  
Imprint:   Oxford University Press
Country of Publication:   United Kingdom
Dimensions:   Height: 240mm,  Width: 162mm,  Spine: 24mm
Weight:   663g
ISBN:   9780199576814
ISBN 10:   0199576815
Pages:   352
Publication Date:  
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational ,  A / AS level ,  Further / Higher Education
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
1: Introduction: Partisanship and the Puzzle of Corporate Governance Change in Europe 2: A Theory of Partisanship and Corporate Governance Change 3: Alternative Explanations of Corporate Governance: A Critique of the Literature 4: Measuring Change in Corporate Governance 5: The Measurement of Product Market Competition 6: A Panel Data Analysis of Corporate Governance Change 7: Robustness and Dynamic Modeling 8: Qualitative Analysis: Introduction to the Case Studies 9: The Case of Germany: From Blockholding to Corporate Governace Regime 10: The Case of Italy: Everything Changes, Everything Stays the Same 11: Conclusions

Roger M. Barker is Head of Corporate Governance at the Institute of Directors. After beginning his career as an economist, Roger spent 13 years in various roles in investment banking in the UK, Germany, and Switzerland. In 2004, Roger moved to Oxford University, where he undertook a doctorate and taught at Merton College. Roger has acted as corporate governance adviser to the EU Economic and Social Committee in Brussels, and is currently a member of the policy committee of the European Confederation of Directors' Associations.

Reviews for Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties: Explaining Corporate Governance Change in Europe

For anyone interested in organizational learning, this book deserves attention. The authors identify and dissect the myriad factors influencing the Challenger and Columbia disasters, including NASA's decision making in a political setting. -W. Henry Lambright, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University NASA learned some important safety-related lessons after the Challenger accident. This valuable book analyzes how this happened. But the subsequent un-learning of these lessons led up to the Columbia accident 17 years later. Mahler's account of that process makes the book all the more valuable. -Eugene Bardach, professor of public policy, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley This book's approach is interesting, very clearly presented, useful for researchers and students, and makes an important contribution to the field. I can see new and established scholars buying this book for its remarkably clear and insightful discussion of the ways in which we consider organizational learning and the things that prevent such learning from happening. -Thomas A. Birkland, William T. Kretzer Distinguished Professor of Public Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, North Carolina State University


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