"The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled ""A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration"" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession."
Edited by:
Philippe Aghion (Robert C. Waggoner Professor of Economics Robert C. Waggoner Professor of Economics Harvard University),
Mathias Dewatripont (Director,
Director,
Banque Nationale de Belgique),
Patrick Legros (Full Professor of Economics,
Full Professor of Economics,
Universiti Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES)),
Luigi Zingales (Robert C. McCormack Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance,
Robert C. McCormack Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance,
Booth School of Business,
University of Chicago)
Imprint: Oxford University Press Inc
Country of Publication: United States
Dimensions:
Height: 238mm,
Width: 162mm,
Spine: 28mm
Weight: 738g
ISBN: 9780199826223
ISBN 10: 0199826226
Pages: 440
Publication Date: 10 March 2016
Audience:
College/higher education
,
Further / Higher Education
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
"PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986 (1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart, JPE, 1986 John Moore (University of Edinburgh) (2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets Bengt Holmström (MIT) (3) Remarks on Incomplete Contracting Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics) (4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs) (5) Grossman and Hart (1986) and Applied Theory Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries (6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions Wouter Dessein (Columbia University) (7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein's ""Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions"" Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan) (8) Comment on ""Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions"" by Wouter Dessein Michael D. Whinston (MIT) PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization (9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics) (10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen ""Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms,"" P. John Roberts (Stanford University) (11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model: Comments on ""Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms,"" by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University) PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance (12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control Patrick Bolton (Columbia University) (13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton's ""Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control"" Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) (14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for Finance Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms (15) Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing Josh Lerner (Harvard University) (16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) (17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small Firms Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University) PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization (18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University) (19) Discussion of ""Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future"", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman Mathias Dewatripont (Université libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium) (20) Discussion of ""Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future"", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan) PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade (21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production Pol Antràs (Harvard University) (22) Comment on Pol Antràs: ""Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production"" Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University) (23) The Theory of the Firm Goes Global Dalia Marin (University of Munich) PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership (24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms Paul Grout (University of Bristol) (25) Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and Hart Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School) (26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property Rights Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University) PART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy (27) International Treaties as Incomplete Contracts Bård Harstad (University of Oslo) (28) Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley) (29) Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Constitutions Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University) PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity (30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts Eric Maskin (Harvard University) (31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts John Moore (University of Edinburgh) (32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design Richard Holden (University of New South Wales) (33) Complexity and Undescribability Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics) PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication (34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts: Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne) (35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich) (36) Incomplete Contracting in the Field Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)"
Philippe Aghion is the Robert C. Waggoner Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a fellow of the Econometric Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Mathias Dewatripont is Director of the National Bank of Belgium, Professor of Economics at the Université libre de Bruxelles. and a fellow of the Econometric Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Patrick Legros is Professor of Economics at the Université libre de Bruxelles in Belgium and a fellow of its research center ECARES. Luigi Zingales is Robert C. McCormack Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance and Charles M. Harper Faculty Fellow at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
Reviews for The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics
"""The contributions in this collection constitute a most worthy celebration of Grossman and Hart's classic paper on incomplete contracting and its deep and wide-ranging impact on economics and beyond."" -- Bengt Holmstrom, Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics, M.I.T ""The Grossman -Hart incomplete contracts approach represents perhaps the most influential advance in economic theory in the last 30 years. This book assembles many of the remarkable offspring of this truly seminal contribution."" -- Andrei Shleifer, Professor of Economics, Harvard University"
