International environmental agreements provide a basis for countries to address ecological problems on a global scale. However, countries are heterogeneous with respect to their economic structures and to the problems relating to the environment that they encounter. Therefore, economic externalities and global environmental conflicts are common and can cause problems in implementation and compliance with international agreements.
Economics of International Environmental Agreements illuminates those issues and factors that might cause some countries or firms to take different positions on common problems. This book explores why international environmental agreements deal with some problems successfully but fail with others. The chapters address issues that are global in nature, such as: transboundary pollution, provision of global public goods, individual preferences of inequality- aversion, global cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, emission standards, abatement costs, environmental quota, technology agreement and adoption and international institutions. They examine the necessary conditions for the improved performance of international environmental agreements, how cooperation among countries can be improved and the incentives that can be created for voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements.
This text is of great importance to academics, students and policy makers who are interested in environmental economics, policy and politics, as well as environmental law.
Introduction Part I Stability: External and Internal 1. What Drives Compliance with International Environmental Agreements? A Political Economy Analysis of International and National Determinants Sarah Al Doyaili and Leo Wangler 2. Stable Environmental Agreements and International Trade In Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets Michel Cavagnac and Guillaume Cheikbossian 3. The Effects of Inequality Aversion on the Formatıon of Climate Coalition: Theory and Experimental Evidence Yu-Hsuan Lin Part II Heterogeneous Countries 4. Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors Achim Hagen, Leonhard Kähler and Klaus Eisenack 5. International Trade and Environmental Cooperation among Heterogeneous Countries Soham Baksi and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri 6. The Effects of Labor Intensity and Pollution Damage on Government Policies and Location Choice Benan Zeki Orbay and Narod Erkol Part III Firm Heterogeneity 7. Foreign Penetration and Environmental Policies Sajal Lahiri and Yingyi Tsai 8. Abatement Level in Environmental Agreements when Firms are Heterogeneous in Abatement Cost Luis Gautier 9. Environmental Quota in an Asymmetric Trade Competition with Heterogeneous Firms Rafael Salvador Espinosa Ramirez and M. Özgür Kayalıca Part IV Environmental Technology 10. The Effectiveness of International Technology Agreements for Environmental Issues: The Impacts of R&D Costs Chisa Kajita and Toshiyuki Fujita 11. Adaptation Technology and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements Hassan Benchekroun, Walid Marrouch and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri 12. Cooperation in Environmental
M. Özgür Kayalıca is a professor of Economics at Istanbul Technical University, Turkey. One of his main research interests is environmental economics, especially the environment and trade issues, with game theoretic applications. Selim Çağatay is a professor of Economics at Akdeniz University, Turkey. His research focuses on sustainable development, migration and applied policy analysis. Hakan Mıhçı is a professor of Economics at Hacettepe University, Turkey. One of his main research interests is development economics, especially human development and environment-related issues.
